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Basic Structures of European Community Law and
Different National Legal Systems
ULRICH EVERLING

1. Introduction
The European Community is a unique phenomenon in public international law. It is
more than a traditional international Organisation, but it is not a Nation State. It has
sovereign rights of its own, but the Member States are still exercising the core of their
sovereignty.
Economic affairs are the main subject of Community's Actions. They have many
effects to political matters governed by the Member States. Those matters are more and
more discussed on the Community level. But law is offering the instruments by which
the Community is acting. The Community has no other means to enforce its measures
than legal rules. It has no factual power for this purpose and exists only by the authority
of the law. Thus, law is the basis of the Community; it is a Community of law.
2. Base of the Community's

Legal Order

The European Community has been established by international treaties among the
Member States. By that, the Member States have transferred parts of their sovereignty to
the Community according to the written or unwritten rules of their constitutions. The
"transfer" of sovereign rights-an expression of article 24 of the German Basic Lawdoes not mean a real alienation of a part of the states' sovereignty to the Community. The
Member States rather conferred those rights to the Community and abandoned,
correspondingly, their exercise.
It must be mentioned, that there are legally three European Communities, i.e. the
Economic Community as the most important, the Community of Coal and steel as the
eldest and t~e atomic Community. Though each of them possesses separate legal
personality, they have common institutions and form one unit from a political point of
view so that it is usual to speak of the Community in the singular.
It is generally recognized that Community law is a separate legal system, distinct
from the legal systems of the Member States. Community law is enacted by its own
institutions which decide, within the limits of their competences, independently of the
Member States.
.3. The Decision-making

Process

of the Community

According to the Treaty, three of the Community's institutions-i.e .. Council,
Commission and European Parliament-are involved in the decision-making process, the
fourth-the Court of Justice-controls the procedures.·
In spite of the growing role of the European Parliament, the Council is still the
central institution for legislature. It consists of the delegates of the Member States, each
of them being represented by a member of its government. The Treaty provides for
decisions by unanimity only in some cases concerning the fundamentals of the
Community, but normally for decisions by qualified majority.
Nevertheless, the Council nearly always practices unanimity in the past. For some
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years, however, it decides more and more by majority. The Council is certainly further
more the institution destined to co-ordinate the policies of the Member States, to search
for a broad consensus between them and to find compromises which may be accepted by
all of them. But if it fails to elaborate a common solution, the majority overrules the
resisting Member States which do not exercise a right of veto.
Normally, the Council can only decide if the seco,nd organ, the Commission, has
presented a proposal. The Commission consists of 17 independent personalities. They are
named by the Member States-each
of the bigger nominating two and each of. the
smaller, one-but they are not bound by orders of the Member States. The Commission
has not only the right, but also the monopoly to present proposals. As a rule, no
legislation of the Community is possible without an initiative of the Commission.
Furthermore, the Commission executes Community law as far as this is done on the
Community level and not, as normally, left to the Member States.
The European Parliament has been developed step by step from a consultative
assembly of delegated national deputies towards a representation of the peoples. The
members of the Parliament are elected by direct universal suffrage. It decides, in
connection with the Council, on the Community budget, and its assent is necessary in
some cases for association of third countries. As regards legislature procedure, the
European Parliament must not only be consulted on all proposals of the Commission but
in some important cases for harmonization of law it has additional rights. If it processes
amendments to drafts of Council decisions, the Council is entitled, under certain
conditions, to overrule them only by unanimity.
But on the other hand, this position in the decision-making does not correspond to
the rights traditionally attributed to Parliaments. It is therefore demanded to extend the
competences of the Parliament so that its assent shall be necessary to alilegislatory acts
of the Council. A conference of the Member States will be held shortly to deal, among
others, with this question.
By this procedure, a dense network of rules has been created by the institutions. The
mass of these rules is growing steadily, and consequently competences of the Member
_States to decide themselves have been limited. More than 4000 regulations have been
taken by the institutions in 1989, most of them concerning agricultural policy. More
than 1000 directives for harmonisation of law have been decided up to now concerning
nearly all matters of economic law.
4. Judicial

Control

In evolving their legal measures, the political institutions have to act in conformity
with the rules of law. The Court of Justice is competent to control the other institutions
in this regard. It has to ensure that the Treaty and the Community measures are applied
and interpreted homogeneously and in conformity with the rules of law. It is also
competent to decide whether the Member States respect their obligations under the Treaty,
and has to be referee between the institutions as well as between those and, the Member
States.
I

The Court decides in total independence exclusively on the basis of the rules of law
and irrespective of political considerations. It consists of 13 Judges coming from 12
Member States. In addition to that, one of 6 Advocates-Generals panicipates in each
procedure before the Court. His function is to summarize the case objectively and
independently and to present a conclusion at the end of the hearing.

It is apparent that, because of the great number of judges, the procedure is difficult
and takes more time than desirable. The Court decides, therefore, in all cases of minor

Basic Structures of European Community Law

121

importance by chambers of thrve or five members. Furthermore, a tribunal of first
instance has been established under the revisal control of the Court. The tribunal is
competent to decide actions of enterprises and citizens in cases concerning competition
rules and steel regulations and actions of civil servants of the institutions.
But the main difficulty is caused by the distinct origin of the judges. They are formed
by different tradition, education, culture and, in particular, legal orders. They introduce
their different views in the deliberations where the compromises must be found. Thus,
Community law is developed by the Court on the base of the contributions of all legal
orders of the Member States.
The Treaty Provides for direct actions by the Community Institutions among each
other, as happened in budget matters, or against Member States as in the case of an
alleged infringement of an obligation under Community law. The Member States are also
entitled to appeal to the Court if they believe a Community measure to be unlawful, for
instance if they demand more money of one of the common funds than the Commission
is willing to concede. Enterprises or citizens may appeal to the Court if a decision is
addressed to them, as for instance competition decisions, or if a decision, addressed to
an other person, is of direct and individual concern to them. They may also sue for
damages.
Special attention must be given to the second group of procedures, i.e. the
preliminary ruling to submissions of national Courts. When a question concerning the
interpretation of the Treaty or concerning the validity or interpretation of a measure taken
by the institutions is raised before a national Court, it may request the Court to give a
ruling thereon, if it considers this decision necessary to give its judgment; it is obliged to
demand the ruling if it decides in last instance.
This procedure is an impressive example of the supranational nature of the
Community. National Courts and tribunals are obliged to recognize, notwithstanding
their own convictions, the judgement of the Court and to apply it when deciding the case
pending before them. The procedure is very important to ensure uniform interpretation of
Community law in all Member States. It is also essential to the function of the Court to
develop Community law according to the sense and objectives of the treaty.
The Treaty is incomplete, defective and ambiguous, and the acts given by the
institutions need clarifications too. The Court is permanently invoked in interpreting
them and filling up the gaps. Thus, the Court has developed Community law to a real
legal order and enabled the institutions to fulfil their tasks. Community law is to a broad
extent judge-made law.
5. Characteristics

of Community

Law

The law enacted by the institutions is binding to Member States and citizens without
any ratification or assent by national institutions. That is true, in particular, for
Community regulations which are comparable to national acts. A regulation has,
according to the-Treaty, "general application" and "shall be binding in its entirety and
directly applicable in all Member States".
In this respect, the directive which is the second form of Community's actions, has
different effects. It is addressed to the Member States and is binding on them as to the
result to be achieved. Thus, the Member States are obliged to adjust their national law to
the rules of the directive, if necessary, by acts of the national Parliaments. Thus, the
citizen is normally affected not by the directive itself but by his national law. This
indirect legislature is in particular applies in the domain of law harmonisation.
The third form of Community actions is the decision. It is addressed to Member
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States as well as to enterprises or citizens as far as Community law provides
authorizations
to take concrete measures. Thus, it may be characterised
as the
administration act of the institutions.
According to the jurisprudence of the Court, the dispositions of the Treaty as well as
of the rules edicted by the instituti"ns are to a high degree directly applicable in all
Member States so that everybody may invoke them in cases before national Courts.
This is in particular true with regard to the dispositions of the Treaty assuring the
freedoms of the common market, i.e. free movement of goods, of persons, of services
and, with certain limits, of capital. It is also the case with all dispositions of regulations,
and furthermore even of directives. Directives are addressed to the Member States, but if a
disposition of a directive is clear and unconditioned, enterprises and citizens may,
according to the Court, invoke it before national Courts if a Member State did not or did
not correctly transpose it into national law. The national Court then has to apply the
disposition of the directive irrespective of the conflicting national law .
This follows from an other basic principle of the Community law developed by the
jurisprudence. The Court stated that the Community law supersedes all the national law.
This principle assures that the Member States are not able to hinder, conscious or
unconscious, the application of Community law by their own legislation. The national
Courts have to regard the national law as inapplicable if they consider that it is in
contradiction to a rule of Community law. Therefore they are also, alike the Court, judges
of Community law and guarantee its execution and, by means of submission to the Court
for preliminary ruling, its uniform interpretation all over the Community.
6. General

Principles

of Community

Law

One of the most discussed questions of Community law was the protection of human
and fundamental rights with regard to measures taken by the institutions. The Treaty
States nearly nothing in this direction, but it seemed to be totally in the spirit of western
democracy not to let the citizens unsecured against violations by Community measures.
The Court has assumed the task to fill up this gap according to its general function
to "ensure that in the interpretation and application of this Treaty the law is observed."
The Court stated that
"fundamental rights form an integral part of general principles of law, the observance
of which it ensures".
Thus, the Court recognized human and fundamental rights as well as general rules of
administrative
law which the institutions of the Community have to respect when
edicting legislation or taking concrete measures.
For this purpose, the Court is, as he expressed,
"bound to draw inspiration from constitutional traditional common to the Member
States. Similarly, international Conventions for the protection of human rights on
which the Member States have collaborated can supply guidelines which should be
followed within the frame-work of the Community".
Following, the Court has case by case developed a broad filed of civil rights
protecting people against unlawful actions of Community institutions.
To give some examples, rights as property, equality, freedom of movement, liberty
of religious activity are protected. ·Procedural securities as the right of defence, the legal

confidence and the secrecy of legal professions are respected. The application of the
principle

of the proportionality

assures

that legislature

and administration

of the
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Community do not intervene to an higher degree in the economic and personal liberty
more than is necessary to achieve the objects of the Treaty.
At present, there is a discussion whether a written catalogue of individual rights
should be introduced by a formal amendment of the Treaty. This would enforce the
protection of the citizens and at the same time grant to the Community substantial
worthies which might serve to confirm its identity as an international body with state-like
mobilities.

7. Acceptance

of Community

Law by the Continental

Legal Orders

It is obvious that the legal orders of the Member States are substantially concerned if
such a mass of law edited by independent institutions is directly applied in their territory
with superseding force on national law. Most Member States 'have had difficulties to
accept this situation and to integrate the Community law in their constitutional systems.
Only those Member States as, for instance, the Netherlands, which recognize by their
constitution a monist relationship between international and domestic law encountered no
problems to accept the application of the Community law.
But in France, where also, following a monist understanding according to the
constitution, international treaties supersede. national law the question arose whether the
Courts were entitled to let national acts unapplied. Corresponding to the traditional
interpretation of the separation of powers, French Courts are not authorised to decide
about the constitutionality of acts of Parliament.
In the seventies, the cour de cassation decided otherwise with regard to Community
law taking in account its special nature. The Conseild'Etat, however, competent in
administration matters, resisted longtimes. It was only last autumn that it changed its
jurisprudence and interpreted the Constitution in the sense that it can declare national acts
inapplicable which are in contradiction to international treaties and especially to
Community law.
Member states of a traditional dualist understanding of international law as, for
instance, Germany and Italy, encountered more difficulties. In the Federal Republic, the
Bundesverfassungsgericht,
i.e. the constitutional Court, recognised relatively early that
Community law supersedes national acts even if the latter are decided later. It has
concluded this from the disposition of the Basic Law authorizing the transfer of sovereign
rights to supranational bodies because such transfer has limiting effects to national
competences. But it reserved its position with regard to the constitutional rules protecting
fundamental rights.
In this regard, German jurisprudence has changed. In the seventies, the Constitutional
Court decided that it was competent to control whether the Community law respected
fundamental rights as long as the Community law comprises no written catalogue of
fundamental rights equal to those of the German Basic Law and edicted by a Parliament.
In 1986, the Constitutional Court recognized that in the meantime the Community
Court had developed a rich jurisprudence safeguarding the rights of the citizens. The
Constitutional
Court therefore decided that it could refrain from examining the
Community law as long as the protection of fundamental rights will be guaranteed on the
Community's level, especially by the European Court, in a manner which is comparable
to the German Basic Law, in particular to the essentials of its fundamental rights.
Astonishingly, the discussion has not been finished by this judgment. Many scholars
demand a revision of this jurisprudence. They also claim that the Constitutional Court
should control w,hether the Community institutions
respect the limits of their
competences.
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The discussion in Italy was similar to Jhat in Germany. A special problem arose
because the Italian Constitutienal Gourt claimed to be exclusively competent to declare
the inapplicability of a national act not being in conformity with Community law.
This position was not accepted by the Community Court which decided strictly
otherwise. Only in the eighties the Italian Constitutional Court accepted that Community
law supersedes national law so that every national Court is entitled to decide on its
application. But concerning fundamental rights the Court reserves which are comparable
to those pronounced by the German Constitutional Court. It may be presumed that the
new Member States Greece, Spain and Portugal will take a similar position.
To sum up it may be said that the Community law is in principle accepted and
respected in all continental Member States. Nevertheless in practice, there may be many
difficulties. The wording of Community rules, for instance, is unusual to Germans and
causes manifold misunderstanding.
But the basic structure of Community law is in
conformity with the principles underlying German law. The same is true for the legal
orders of the other Member States influenced by Roman law.
8. Acceptance
Common
Law

of

Community

Law

by

the

Legal

Orders

based

on

With regard to this question', the situation is more complex in the United Kingdom.
When it become a member of the Community, many observers wondered whether it
would be able to satisfy the legal requirements of membership. Questions arose with
regard to the doctrine of the sovereignty of the British Parliament which does not
recognize any superior authority. Difficulties also seemed to exist for the application of
the Community law and in particular of the harmonization directives to the English legal
order because of the system of common law.
After an experience of nearly 20 years, it may be summarized
problems exist in practice even if many questions are open in theory.

I

that no serious

The attitude of the United Kingdom is strictly dualist. There is no general rule
allowing international treaties to take effect in the internal legal system. Since the United
Kingdom has a largely unwritten constitution, there is no possibility to overcome the
difficulty by an amendment of the Constitution as was done in Ireland. International
treaties are concluded, i.e. signed and ratified, exclusively by the Crown, but they only
have effects within the intemallaw if a special Act of Parliament is decided.
Thus, the European Communities
Internal legal order fixing that

Act of 1972 enacted the Community Law in the

"all such rights, powers, liabilities, obligations and restrictions from time to time
created or arising by or under the Treaties ... , as in accordance with the Treaties are
without further enactment to be given legal effect or used in the United Kingdom,
shall be recognized and available in law, and be enforced, allowed and followed
accordingly ... "
These words which are nearly incomprehensible
to a continental lawyer not
accustomed to the English tradition assures the application of Community law in the
internal law . The relationship to the internal law is regulated in the manner that
"any such provi.sion as might be made by Act of Parliament, and any enactment
passed or to be passed ... shall be construed and have effect subject to the foregoing
provisions of this section ... "
A similar formula exists for the interpretation
decided by the Court.

and the effect of Community law as
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The significance of these dispositions is discussed among scholars on the background
of the disputed thesis of the sovereignty of the Parliament. It seems that as a rule the
British Courts recognize Community law to supersede national law and that they interpret
the Acts of Parliaments in the sense that Parliament respected this principle. But this
interpretation is not possible against the express will of the Parliament, as Lord Denning
who was opinion-leader in this matter, stated:
"If the time should come when Parliament deliberately passes an Act with the
intention of repudiating the Treaty or any provision in it or intentionally of acting
inconsistently with it and says so in express terms, then I should have thought that it
would be the duty of our Courts to follow the statute".
But he added the comforting words:
"I do not however envisage any such situation .. Unless there is such an intentional
and express repudiation of the Treaty, it is our duty to give priority to the Treaty".
It must be recognized that these last phrases correspond to the reality and that the
reserve is as theoretical as the reserves expressed by the German Constitutional Court as
well as the Italian. To my knowledge, there is no case in whiCh the British Parliament did
not draw the consequences of the decisions of the Council or the judgments of the Court
in due time. The decision and judgement are often discussed and criticized in the
newspapers or even in Parliament, but afterwards they are normally executed correctly.
Thus, the United Kingdom is, notwithstanding all the theories of sovereignty of
Parliament, regularly among the first Member States executing directives for the
harmonization of law. It is also among the last in the statistics concerning actions against
Member States for infringement of an obligation under the Treaty. Furthermore, the
English Courts normally apply loyally without hesitation the judgements of the
European Court even if it is obvious that they do not agree with them. It seems to the
external observer that the theoretical reserve expressed by Lord Denning has no practical
significance to the decisions of English Courts.
But apparently it is not easy for English Lawyers to get accustomed to Community
law. Up to now, they have found their rules mainly in the common law which is built up
on precedential cases. Statute law has been given in particular to regulate economic
matters. Now they are confronted with the overwhelming
mass of Community
regulations and directives. Lord Denning has described the feeling of English Lawyers by
the following famous sentences:
"The Treaty does not touch any of the matters which concern solely the mainland of
England and the people in it. These are still governed by English law ... But when
we come to matters with a European element, the Treaty is like a incoming tide. It
flows into the estuaries and up the rivers. It cannot be held back. Parliament has
decreed that the Treaty is henceforward to be part of our law."
In an other context, he continues in describing this picture as follows:
"All this shows that the flowing tide of the Community law is coming in fast. It has
not stopped at high-water mark. It has broken the dykes and the banks. It has
submerged the surrounding land. So much that we have to become amphibious if we
wish to keep our heads above water."
Those words express a certain
experienced lawyer who has longtimes
strange rules. But the quotations also
the Community law loyally, according

regret or even resignation which overcomes an
practiced common law and is now confronted with
shows that he is disposed to apply the Treaty and
to the decisions of the English Parliament.
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A main problem for the application of Community law by English lawyers is the
different wording of its legal texts in comparison to those of English law. Formulations
as cited of the European Communities Act with its manifold concrete details, numerous
adjectives, modalities and repetitions are only understandable if they are regarded as
exception from the rules of the common law. But they are totally unusual in the
continental legal orders influenced by Roman law, whose texts are formulated in general
terms and in abstract form.
Once more Lord Denning has explained the situation in classical words:
tiThe (BEC) Treaty is quite unlike any of the enactments to which we have become
accustomed ... It lays down general principles. It expresses its aims and purposes.
All in sentences of moderate length and commendable style. But it lacks precision. It
uses words and phrases without defining what they mean. An English lawyer would
look for an interpretation clause, but he would look in vain. There'is none. All the
way through the Treaty there are gaps and lacunae. These have to be filled in by
judges, or by regulations or directives. It is the European way ... Seeing these
differences, what are the English Courts to do when they are faced with a problem of
interpretation? They must follow the European pattern. No longer must they argue
about the precise grammatical sense. They must look to the purpose and intent. ..
They must divine the spirit of the Treaty and gain inspiration from it. If they find a
gap, they must fill it as best they can ... These are the principles, as I understand it,
on which the European Court acts."
These words, which were spoken 1974 in Bulmer v Bollinger 1974, define precisely
the differences between the European practice and the Anglo-Saxon tradition. They are
correct even today, and many English lawyers tend to a more literal interpretation of the
Community law than their continental collegues. but most of them have understood that
they must argue in the manner corresponding to the European system if they will have a
chance to influence the practice. That is true not only for the members of the Court
formed by common law but in particular for the lawyers pleading before the Court. They
mostly argue impressing on· the base of the European costumes and differ of their
continental colleagues only positively because of their pragmatic approach and their
common sense. It seems to me that also in this regard the assimilation of the behaviour
in practice will overrule the theoretical and traditional differences in the course of time.

9. Outlook
I hope that my presentation has given an impression of the great number of
difficulties which the Community encounters when its.law is incorporated in the rules
existing in the Member States. But generally it may be said, that Community law is
accepted and applied loyally in all Member States even though their legal orders are quite
different
I also hope to have demonstrated that the Community is progressing step by step and
has already reached a remarkable strength. It started rather modestly, but now-a-days, it
represents an important factor in world policy.
The further development
will go towards a political European Federation.
Negotiations for this purpose will begin at the end of this year. The Community must be
enabled to become a centre of the European Peace Order which brings East and West
together. By this, it will also help to stabilize the situation in other parts of the world.

